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Introduction 
 
‘[A] surprising thing happened on the way to the death of God: 
Enlightenment secularism also got crucified on the same Cross, 
and that spelled the death of the death of God;’2 ‘Today, Marx, 
Nietzsche, and Freud are all dead but God is doing just fine, 
thank you very much.’3 So cheers John D Caputo—along, no 
doubt, with a heavenly host of ‘postmodern’ theologians and 
philosophers of religion—in the service of ‘rethinking’ religion in 
terms of a ‘post-secular’ interpretation of the world, wherein 
‘postmodern’ theory is said to open the space for the return of 
‘the religious’ and for the repositioning of religion in the third 
millennium CE.4 But before we join the choir, it will be 
advantageous to critically examine the idea of post-secularity, 
particularly as such a notion emerges from contemporary 
religious theory that draws heavily on the later thought of 
Jacques Derrida. For if, as Caputo lauds, ‘the flower of religion is 
one of the blossoms in our postmodern anthology,’5 then perhaps 
we ought to discover how ‘postmodernism’—or, more precisely, 
Derridean deconstruction(ism)—is understood to create a post-
                                                
1This article draws heavily on Master of Arts research undertaken at the 
Melbourne College of Divinity under the supervision of Dr Robyn 
Horner who is duly noted and gratefully acknowledged. 
2 John D Caputo, On Religion, London, 2001, 59. 
3 Ibid, 64. 
4 For two robust accounts of how Derrida’s thought might be understood as 
opening a space for the religious, see Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign: 
Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy, Cambridge, 1985, and John D 
Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion, 
Indiana, 1997. 
5 Caputo, On Religion, op cit, 66. 
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secular space for religion and whether there is anything 
problematic about the Derridean deconstructive gesture when it 
is placed into the service of religious theory and (primarily 
Christian) theology.  
 
There are at least two lines of argument that might be employed 
here. On the one hand, it could be argued that theologians and 
religious theorists have co-opted and ‘gentrified’ the radicality of 
différance (even if this ‘gentrification’ can perhaps be traced to 
Derrida’s own later ‘turn to the religious’) and that post-secularity 
is not an inevitable product of the original deconstructive impetus 
but the ‘domestication’ of différance subsisting within a practice 
of deconstructionism. The ‘answer’ or ‘corrective’ to post-
secularity would then be a return to the earlier Derrida of 
différance against the contemporary ‘Derrida’ of post-secularity.6 
On the other hand, it could be argued that the fundamental idea 
of différance is itself not radical enough, particularly in terms of 
the ‘minimal difference’ or parallactic gap7 that separates the 
One from itself, which is mishandled in Derrida’s work on the 
Other (tout autre) and language (‘il n’y a pas de hors-texte’).8 The 
                                                
6 Several theorists have argued in this vein. See, for example, Ernesto Laclau, 
Emancipation(s), London, 1995; and Christopher Norris’ recent interview on 
music, religion and art in Michael Payne and John Schad, editors, 
life.after.theory, London, 2003,115-32.  
7 Space constraints forbid a detailed explication of Žižek’s ‘parallax gap’ here 
but the basic idea is that of the insurmountable and irreducible gap which posits 
a limit to the field of reality and which is perceptible in the shift between two 
closely linked perspectives between which no neutral ground is possible. More 
accurately, it is not two perspectives as much as a perspective and that which 
eludes it, with the other perspective ‘filling out’ the void which the first 
perspective obscured. In other words, it is the gap, or non-coincidence, 
between the One and itself. For a comprehensive defence of this idea, see 
Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View, Cambridge, 2006. 
8 It could also be added here that part of the Lacanian approach entails moving 
from the level of meaning to the level of jouissance, a move which Derrida does 
not make due to his inscribing of everything within the level of meaning (as 
there is nothing hors-texte). Žižek argues that a crucial weakness of post-
structuralist critiques of ideology is the failure to engage the second level of 
Lacan’s graph of desire (see his The Sublime Object of Ideology, London, 
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‘answer’ or ‘corrective’ to post-secularity would then be to submit 
it to psychoanalytical ‘treatment’ and to undercut its basis by 
demonstrating the way in which Derrida misreads Lacan.9  
 
This second approach requires a reading of Lacan that is 
explicitly anti-post-structuralist, demonstrating the distance 
between Lacan and Derrida and between psychoanalysis and 
post-structuralism, even if both sets of discourse employ similar 
motifs. In fact, the utilisation of similar motifs may provide a key 
to understanding why post-secularity emerges from the marriage 
of religion and deconstructionism and what the fundamental 
                                                                                                       
1989, 87-129). Both levels work together as complementary procedures 
whereby (1) the ‘meaning’ vector entails a deconstructive reading of ideology in 
terms of identifying the montage of heterogeneous ‘floating signifiers’ and the 
hegemonic ‘quilting’ of the master signifier, and (2) the ‘fantasy’ vector entails 
an articulation of the surplus enjoyment (jouissance) that is beyond and internal 
to the field of meaning (a monstrous excess within the system) which is the final 
support for ideology. If this is extended to the matter under investigation here, it 
can be said that Derrida collapses everything into one vector (meaning), which 
opens a space for the post-secular in the play of signifiers rather than 
understanding that space as itself caught in the ‘swerve of the Real’ (which 
would be ‘discovered’ if he proceeded to the level of desire). 
9 There are, of course, other ‘answers’ to post-secular thought, such as the so-
called ‘radical orthodoxy’ of Milbank, where Jesus Christ takes the place of the 
‘theological sublime’ which fills all ‘space’ and where the theological is 
absolutely primary, mediating all other forms of knowledge (see John Milbank, 
The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture, Oxford, 1997) and the 
‘post-metaphysical’/‘post-phenomenological’ approach of Jean-Luc Marion, 
where the name of God is saved by crossing it out (see his Dieu sans l’être: 
Hors-texte, 2ème edition, Paris, 2002) and where (at least in his earlier work) 
revelation ‘overcomes’ metaphysics. Both approaches draw on Derrida and 
explore the question of the destitution of metaphysics. However, both begin 
from the standpoint of a theo-logic, where God ‘grounds’ the system, even if 
this grounding is explicitly not metaphysical. In the final analysis, God functions 
as a centre of gravity for both approaches. And it is exactly this centre of gravity 
that will be displaced by means of a psychoanalytical critique of post-secularity, 
particularly in terms of the Lacanian ‘swerve of the Real’. There is a sense then, 
that the psychoanalytical ‘answer’ to post-secularity is also an answer to ‘radical 
orthodoxy’ and ‘post-metaphysical theory of religion.’ In other words, they are 
not really ‘answers’ to post-secularity as much as fundamentally caught within 
the same gravitational pull. 
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problematic is, namely, a stopping-short of the full significance of 
Lacan’s thought in its difference (no pun intended) from Derrida’s 
(of which several motifs share the same ‘name’) and, more 
pointedly, a misconstrual of the Other and the void around which 
symbolic space revolves (a misconstrual which permits the 
emergence of the ‘post-secular’).  
 
This paper is offered as an explication of this second approach, 
not in terms of a comprehensive examination of post-secularity 
or Derrida’s ‘turn to the religious’ but in terms of the post-secular 
problematic identified above and the psychoanalytical 
‘overcoming’ of it. In order to provide a succinct explication of 
(and potential ‘corrective’ for) this problematic, I will utilise the 
Lacanian notion of the ‘swerve of the Real’ as it has been 
articulated by Slavoj Žižek throughout his recent work. For, as I 
hope to show, the swerve of symbolic space in reference to the 
Real provides a perfect counterpoint to the opening of post-
secular space in reference to the Derridean tout autre, thus 
problematising the very notion of the ‘post-secular.’ 
 
The Post-secular Problematic and its Psychoanalytical 
Treatment 
 
‘Religion’ and ‘deconstruction’ have been paired over the past 
twenty-five years as a strategy for ‘saving’ the name (sauf le 
nom) of God and providing a ‘space’ for religious believers to 
inhabit. Caputo’s ‘post-secular’ theory, as a premier example, 
draws from Blanchot’s sans and Derrida’s différance to offer a 
‘religion sans religion’ that explicitly ‘put[s] deconstruction to work 
in the service of religious faith’ and provides the logic for a ‘post-
secular’ analysis of contemporary life.10 The idea of ‘post-
                                                
10 B Keith Putt, ‘What do I love when I love my God? An Interview with John D 
Caputo’ in James H Olthuis, editor, Religion With/out Religion: The Prayers and 
Tears of John D Caputo, London, 2002, 157. For a presentation of how Caputo 
explicitly connects deconstruction and religion or, more properly, conceives of 
deconstruction as religion, that is, the ‘repetition’ of the religious edge to 
experience without institutional or onto-theological accretions, see my ‘The 
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secularity’ rests on the judgement that Derridean deconstruction 
clears the way for the ‘return of the religious’ by means of 
critiquing onto-theology and critiquing the judgements of thinkers 
such as Nietzsche, Freud and Marx, whose respective critiques 
of religion have become ‘unstuck’ in the postmodern age. But 
does deconstruction open a space for this return or rather signal 
a malady in terms of the Real?11  
 
The matter under investigation here is more than that of differing 
interpretations of the return of the religious. The point of this 
critique is that deconstruction when applied to religion is itself 
caught in the ‘swerve of the Real,’ a point that will be explicated 
fully below. So while there is no debate here over the dissolution 
of onto-theology (and the rise of the secular), there is debate 
over whether deconstruction has opened a space for ‘God’ and 
the return of the religious (so-called post-secularisation). The first 
step is not contentious, namely, that the critique of metaphysics 
entails the ‘dissolution’ of onto-theology, mind-body dualism, 
detached universal ahistorical rationality, and so on. But what 
follows from this critique is contentious, namely, that, by means 
of postmodern critique, the secular age is over and the repressed 
voice of the religious gains a space and achieves new legitimacy. 
Put in blunt terms, the postmodern critique of modernity is said to 
‘produce’ post-secularity (in the sense of its inescapable 
outcome). What then is the inherent problematic? It is three-fold: 
first, the ‘post-secular’ position is wedded to a particular 
interpretation of the return of the religious (in fact it is this 
interpretation) that celebrates a certain deconstructive process 
whereby the religious (and the name of God) is saved by 
                                                                                                       
Religious 'a-Dieu': John Caputo’s Post-structuralist Religious Theory and the 
Repositioning of Religion in the Third Millennium’ in the forthcoming issue of 
Australian Religious Studies Review, Vol 19, No 2, 2006. 
11 I will be utilising several Lacanian terms (such as the ‘Real’) throughout this 
paper without explicitly unpacking the particular nuances that Žižek places upon 
them. However, I will briefly explicate the basic tenor of such terms as 
necessary during the final sections, which carry the most analytical weight. 
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opening it to the ‘Other;’12 second, the deconstructive gesture 
(read in a Lacanian manner) removes the materiality of particular 
religions in order to retain the matrix in which religion subsists 
but deprived of its vital content;13 and third, there is a reliance on 
                                                
12 This relies upon the validity of a particular reading of Nietzsche, Marx and 
Freud, whereby each thinker is portrayed as misinterpreting religion due to a 
lack of appreciation for the choreography of the pre-modern religious scene 
(particularly in the sense of pre-moderns responding to an excess in their 
experience of God) rather than attempting to provide a then-contemporary 
choreography of the then-contemporary world (that is, attending to the ‘cultural 
politics’ of their own time). 
13 Although I will not pursue this point in the body of this paper, it is fecund to 
ask whether the creation of a post-secular space contributes to the destitution 
of that which it sought to save (namely ‘God’ and religion) by making a ‘false 
move’ that psychoanalytical thought might correct. By submitting religion to the 
double logic of the sans and locating the ‘religious’ that gives rise to particular 
religions, has not deconstruction inadvertently signalled the final theoretical 
‘gasp’ of religion prior to its inevitable demise? This is one of Žižek’s major lines 
of argument in reference to the religious sensitivity in deconstructionism. For 
according to a Lacanian reading of contemporary culture (as expounded by 
Žižek) deconstructionism, rather than ‘clearing’ the way for ‘God,’ actually sets 
up the final dissolution of religion by removing that which really matters. By 
applying the sans to religion (in an attempt to open it to the tout autre) the 
materiality of particular religions are removed in order to retain the matrix in 
which religion subsists but deprived of its vital content: ‘What if the fundamental 
experience of human subjects is not that of self-presence, or the force of 
dialectical mediation-appropriation of all Otherness, but of a primordial 
passivity, sentiency, or responding, of being infinitely indebted to and 
responsible for the call of an Otherness that never acquires positive features 
but always remains withdrawn, the trace of its own absence? One is tempted to 
evoke here Marx’s famous quip about Proudhon’s Poverty of Philosophy 
(instead of actual people in their actual circumstances, Proudhon’s pseudo-
Hegelian social theory gives these circumstances themselves, deprived of the 
people who bring them to life): instead of the religious matrix with God at its 
heart, post-secular deconstruction gives us the matrix itself, deprived of the 
positive figure of God that sustains it (Žižek, Interrogating the Real, op cit, 340-
1).’ So, whereas a post-secular interpretation sees the result of deconstruction 
in reference to religion as a ‘clearing’ of the way for ‘God,’ it actually sets up its 
final dissolution by removing that which really matters. Appropriating Hegel, 
Žižek notes that ‘Whenever I resort to the strategy of renouncing the Inessential 
in order to save the Essential, sooner or later (but always when it is already too 
late) I’m bound to discover that I made a fatal mistake as to what is essential, 
and that the essential dimension has already slipped through my fingers’ (Ibid, 
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the validity of the deconstructive understanding of the Other (tout 
autre) and a particular view of language wherein there is nothing 
apart from signifiers (there is no ‘metalanguage’ in the Derridean 
rather than Lacanian sense).14  
 
Thus, post-secularity’s reliance on the deconstructive gesture (in 
a sense it is this gesture) to open a space for the return of the 
religious falters if the validity of that gesture is shown to be 
untenable. While each aspect of the abovementioned 
problematic could be explicated here, I will restrict my analysis to 
the third, focusing on the way that a Lacanian understanding of 
the Real and language recasts the post-secular space. This will 
allow an exploration of how the pairing of religion and 
deconstruction might be understood to betray a malady in 
reference to the Lacanian Real, revealing a ‘bone in the throat’ of 
religion that is ‘gentrified’ in terms of the tout autre by the 
deconstructive gesture. 
 
In Lacanian psychoanalysis, at least as read by Žižek, the 
treatment is said to be over when the patient is able to accept the 
non-existence of the big ‘Other.’15 The patient, finally dropping 
the ‘name’ of that which bound her, is delivered from her malady 
in order to live in a space that is no longer drawn into the event 
horizon of that ‘name.’ Put in slightly different language, the force 
of that name, now that the name is shown to be illusory, no 
longer provokes a certain mental ‘swerve of the Real’ but is 
shown to be the product rather than the cause of the process 
whereby the symbolic order arose.16 In other words, the patient 
                                                                                                       
216). The essential dimension that has slipped through the fingers of post-
secular interpretation is the very materiality and particularity of religion, not its 
‘religious’ core. For the ‘religious,’ rather than being the core of the religions, 
turns out to be the surplus Thing, the religious Real of the symbolic order.  
14 For an explication of this difference, including an explanation of how Derrida 
misreads Lacan (in reference to le titre de la lettre), see Žižek, Sublime Object 
of Ideology, op cit, 153-99. 
15 See Slavoj Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of 
Christianity, Cambridge, 2003, 169-70. 
16 Žižek utilises these notions in connection with Einstein’s theories of relativity 
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(through her relationship with the analyst) locates the Real 
‘Thing’ to which she was responding and which had been 
producing her illness. Once this ‘Real’ ceases to function as an 
essentialised part of the patient’s interpretive framework (it is 
seen to be the ‘nonexistent’ void which curves symbolic space) 
the patient is ‘healed’ and the particular ‘Thing’ that had 
functioned as the Real no longer binds the patient and is 
cursorily discarded. When this ‘treatment’ is applied to the 
question of post-secularity, the following can be asked: what if 
the patient in question is ‘religion,’ or more properly, human 
beings inhabiting a post-secular ‘space’ and adhering to a post-
secular religious centre of gravity? Can the Lacanian ‘treatment’ 
be utilised here as a heuristic device in order to reveal the ‘truth’ 
that post-secularity represses and to ‘save’ human beings from 
the swerve of this Real? It is the wager of this paper that it can. 
But in order to make my case, I will need to briefly explicate the 
Lacanian psychoanalytical framework that provides a basis for 
understanding how the ‘post-secular’ space is caught in the 
‘swerve of the Real.’  
 
The Lacanian Real and the Derridean tout autre 
 
There is a world of difference between Lacan’s understanding of 
the Real (and the ‘Thing’ and the big ‘Other’) and Derrida’s 
understanding of the tout autre. This difference provides the 
basis for understanding how the post-secular space can be 
understood as caught in the swerve of the Real. In what follows, I 
will briefly explicate Lacan’s understanding of the Real (as read 
by Žižek), including its place in his overall framework, and 
indicate how his understanding undermines the Derridean ‘take’ 
on the tout autre and language.  
                                                                                                       
(both general and special) in The Puppet and the Dwarf, ibid, 59-91, hence the 
above allusion to spatio-temporal laws. Note here that while the force of the 
name is the product of the symbolic order, the Real is both that which forbids 
access to this order and the forbidding of access itself. It is that which resists 
symbolisation and that which is left over in the process by which the symbolic 
order is established. More will be made of this point below. 
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In Lacanian terms, the Real is the parallactic gap that separates 
the One from itself, the shifting perspective that distorts reality 
and rises from the symbolic order that human beings inhabit. But 
this statement requires further explication, especially the term 
‘Real’ which operates in Lacan according to three modalities, 
sometimes expressed as Lacan’s ISR triad of the Real: the 
Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real. In simple terms, the 
Imaginary is the Order of the ego, particularly the way in which 
the ego is formed in early childhood (the ‘mirror’ stage), which 
continues to influence adults in their struggle for wholeness and 
unity; the Symbolic is the Order of society, the framework in 
which human beings construct their world (reality as always 
already symbolised), a framework which is bound together by the 
signifying chain wherein language is said to ‘carve up the world;’ 
and the Real is the Order that cannot be directly known, the 
world before it is ‘carved up by language.’  
 
However, to complicate matters, the Real functions in two ways, 
as that which precedes the Symbolic and as that which remains 
after the Symbolic framework is established. It is this second 
sense of the Real that is primarily being utilised by Žižek to 
critique Derrida’s tout autre because the Real (in this sense) is 
the excess that resists symbolisation and appears as a void in 
the Symbolic Order. But even in this usage, the other sense and 
modalities of the Real remain present because of the parallax 
status of the Real. So the Real must be understood as both the 
‘impossible’ hard core that cannot be confronted directly and the 
‘nonexistent’ void reconstructed retroactively in terms of the 
symbolic formations that point to it. It is purely non-substantial 
and is best described as the gap between two perspectives (the 
One and itself). The deconstructive gesture when applied to 
religion, then, on this reading, does not open religion to the tout 
autre (and provide a ‘post-secular’ space) but to the gaps in the 
symbolic order that relate to an excess that resisted 
symbolisation when the symbolic framework was being 
constructed.  
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This ‘reading’ can be heightened by recourse to the Freudian / 
Lacanian ‘Thing’ (das Ding), which sounds like a synonym for 
Derrida’s tout autre but is not equivalent to the Derridean ‘Other’ 
because rather than being seen as that which functions as an 
unattainable ‘impossibility,’ the Thing is that which gives rise to 
the symbolic order itself, that which drives the symbolic order. 
This raises what Žižek refers to as the ‘paradoxical’ status of the 
Real in relation to the impossible. For rather than the impossible 
functioning as a horizon that structurally never arrives (which 
would require an ethics in terms of the Lévinasian call of the 
Other), the impossible actually happens, intruding into the Real: 
 
The deconstructionist ethical edifice is based on the 
IMPOSSIBILITY of the act: the act never happens, it is 
impossible for it to occur, it is always deferred, about to come ... 
The task of the deconstructionist analysis is then to 
demonstrate how what appears (and is misrepresented) as a 
contingent empirical obstacle actually gives body to a proto-
transcendental a priori ... the impossibility is structural, not 
empirical-contingent. ... The Lacanian lesson here [is] not that 
one should accept this obstacle as structurally necessary ... 
[but that] the ‘Real as impossible’ means here that THE 
IMPOSSIBLE DOES HAPPEN ... – this, and not the structural 
obstacle forever deferring the final resolution, is the most 
difficult thing to accept.17 
 
And yet, when this is accepted, particularly when the big ‘Other’ 
is suspended (that is, acknowledged as non-existent, as the 
surplus left behind during the symbolisation process) the truly 
ethical act can transpire not by recourse to respect for the Other 
but by recourse to the truly free choice of refusing a pre-given set 
of co-ordinates in order to change the co-ordinates themselves.18 
The post-secular gesture of opening religion to its other through 
                                                
17 Žižek, On Belief, op cit, 83-4. 
18 For a brief discussion of the Lacanian ‘truly free choice,’ see ibid, 112-27. In 
terms of the Lacanian ‘ethics of the Real’ see Žižek, Interrogating the Real, op 
cit,152-60; 345-48.  
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a ‘religion without religion’ actually opens it to the 
surplus/remainder (excess) which resisted symbolisation so that 
the gesture does not open the way for a return of the religious or 
a saving of the name of God but for an acknowledgment of the 
illusory nature of the big ‘Other’ itself.  
 
The problematic of the deconstructive gesture can be further 
borne out (and clarified) by considering the place of language 
and by contrasting two of Derrida’s couplets (‘supplement/centre’ 
and ‘voice/writing’) with Lacan’s psychoanalytical perspective. 
Taking the couplets first, in the ‘supplement/centre’ couplet, 
Derrida, as read by Žižek, desires to deconstruct the centre by 
an analysis of the supplement (or, in literary terms, the ‘margin’). 
But while Derrida focuses on the way that the supplement 
constitutes the Centre so that there is no Centre without the 
supplement (which must remain supplement, or, in other terms, 
remain at the margin) Lacan argues that the centre itself is 
nothing but the supplement perceived from a certain perspective, 
so that a shift from the centre to the supplement is not about the 
‘thing’ itself but a particular point of view: 
 
the Centre which Derrida endeavours to ‘deconstruct’ is 
ultimately the very supplement which threatens to disrupt its 
totalizing power, or, to put it in Kierkegaardese, the supplement 
is the Centre itself ‘in its becoming’. In this precise sense, 
supplement is the condition of the possibility and the condition 
of the impossibility of the Centre.19 
 
In other words, the supplement is not identified by deconstructing 
the Centre because the entire symbolic network that gives rise to 
the Centre produces an excess which the supplement ‘stands in 
for.’ This point can be strengthened by considering the 
‘voice/writing’ couplet. Derrida (again, as read by Žižek) argues 
that the ‘metaphysics of presence’ arises from an illusion, namely 
the illusion of ‘hearing-oneself-speaking [s’entendre-parler].’20 
                                                
19 Žižek, Interrogating the Real, op cit, 210. 
20 Ibid. 
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Deconstruction, through the employment of différance, operates 
by pointing to a ‘constant and constitutive deferral of impossible 
self-identity’ with the voice functioning as the ‘medium of illusory 
self-transparency.’21 But for Lacan, the voice is not the medium 
of transparent self-presence but the ‘dark spot of non-
subjectivisable remainder, the point of the eclipse of meaning, 
the point at which meaning slides into jouis-sense [enjoyment in 
meaning].’22 In other words, for Derrida, the voice is ‘always-
already tainted with writing, that [is] it always-already contains 
the minimum of the materiality of a trace which introduces an 
interspace, a gap, into the voice’s pure self-presence,’23 whereas 
for Lacan, voice is the 
 
remainder of the signifying operation, ie the meaningless piece 
of the real which stays behind once the operation of ‘quilting’ 
[capitonnage] responsible for the stabilization of meaning is 
performed – in short, voice is that which, in the signifier, 
resists meaning: it stands for the opaque inertia which cannot 
be recuperated by meaning.24 
 
This also applies to language itself, which is a central subject for 
both Derrida and Lacan, particularly the status of the 
‘unnameable,’ a point that concerns the matter under 
investigation in this paper because motifs such as ‘excess’ and 
the ‘tout autre’ are linked to the saving of the name of God in 
post-secular thought. But rather than conceiving of this excess or 
Other as that which lies hors-texte (outside the text), or outside 
the chain of signifiers, in Lacan, this excess or Other is a product 
of symbolisation itself. Language, in this reading, ‘digs a hole’ in 
reality so that the unnameable is understood as an effect of 
language and not an ‘other’ to it. The modality of the Symbolic 
                                                
21 Ibid, 211. 
22 Ibid, 213. Note that Derrida’s failure to make this move is understood as one 
of the major problems with Derrida’s approach from the Lacanian perspective. 
See footnote 7.  
23 Ibid, 211. 
24 Ibid, 211-12. 
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indicates an Order that consists of a chain of signifiers but this 
does not mean that the modality of the Real is engaged by 
dropping language. On the contrary, it is in the very act of 
dropping the allusion to an external referent that the Real is 
understood: 
 
. . . the Real is not external to the Symbolic: the Real is the 
Symbolic itself in the modality of the non-All, lacking an external 
Limit/Exception. In this precise sense, the line of separation 
between the Symbolic and the Real is not only a symbolic 
gesture par excellence, but the very founding gesture of the 
Symbolic and to step into the Real does not entail abandoning 
language . . . but, on the contrary, dropping the very allusion to 
some external point of reference which eludes the Symbolic. . . 
In short, the unnameable is strictly inherent to language. . . It is 
not that we need words to designate objects, to symbolise 
reality, and that then, in surplus, there is some excess of reality, 
a traumatic core that resists symbolization—this obscurantist 
theme of the unnameable Core of Higher Reality that eludes 
the grasp of language is to be thoroughly rejected; not because 
of a naïve belief that everything can be nominated, grasped by 
our reason, but because of the fact that the Unnameable is an 
effect of language. We have reality before our eyes well before 
language, and what language does, in its most fundamental 
gesture, is—as Lacan put it—the very opposite of designating 
reality: it digs a hole in it, it opens up visible/present reality 
toward the dimension of the immaterial/unseen.25 
 
 
The Swerve of the Real 
 
Now that the post-secular problematic has been explicated, the 
Lacanian/Derridean difference has been noted, and the primary 
                                                
25 Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf, op cit, 69-70. This is Žižek’s answer to 
critics who would claim that there is really little difference between the Real and 
the Symbolic, particularly in terms of the distinction being itself inscribed within 
the Symbolic (this could, perhaps, also be applied to a critique on the Lacanian 
Real based on Derrida’s notion of the effect of the ‘trace’). See the full 
discussion in ibid, 67-73. 
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Lacanian motifs have been introduced, it is possible to bring the 
notion of post-secularity into contact with the primary motif 
suggested in the introduction to this paper, namely the swerve of 
the Real, a motif that builds upon the Lacanian material that has 
just been presented. In The Puppet and the Dwarf, Žižek devotes 
a chapter to the way that religion operates according to the Real, 
which he entitles ‘The Swerve of the Real.’26 Beginning with 
‘subtraction’ (establishing the minimal difference between the 
Void and that which stands in for it in the symbolic order) rather 
than ‘purification’ (the attempt to isolate the kernel of the Real 
through ‘peeling off’ – that is via a deconstructive X sans X 
gesture) Žižek suggests a reversal in the way that the Real is 
usually approached, a reversal that echoes Hegel’s reversal of 
Kant over the ‘Thing’ (das Ding). For whereas Kant posits the 
realm of Things-in-Themselves because of the tension between 
the phenomena and the Thing, Hegel points to this tension as 
evidence of an inconsistency between phenomena themselves:
  
 
And is not this shift from purification to subtraction also the shift 
from Kant to Hegel?  From tension between phenomena and 
Thing to an inconsistency/gap between phenomena 
themselves?  The standard notion of reality is that of a hard 
kernel that resists the conceptual grasp—what Hegel does is 
simply to take this notion of reality more literally: nonconceptual 
reality is something that emerges when notional self-
development gets caught in an inconsistency, and becomes 
nontransparent to itself. In short, the limit is transposed from 
exterior to interior: there is Reality because and insofar as the 
notion is inconsistent, doesn’t coincide with itself. The multiple 
perspectival inconsistencies between phenomena are not an 
effect of the impact of the transcendent Thing—on the contrary, 
this Thing is nothing but the ontologization of the inconsistency 
between phenomena.27 
 
                                                
26 Ibid, 58-91. 
27 Ibid, 66. 
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This reversal indicates the way in which Žižek ‘reads’ reality and 
sets up the shift in perspective which is analogous to the shift 
from Einstein’s special to general theory of relativity, a shift that 
indicates how the Real effects the mind, an effect that Žižek 
labels as a ‘swerve of the Real’ and which indicates why human 
beings defer to an Other. As Einstein’s passage from special to 
general relativity is central to this shift, it is important to specify 
exactly how this passage transforms the way reality is 
understood and how this connects with the Lacanian Real. The 
following passage follows from the one quoted above and 
indicates the way that the Hegelian reversal is homologous to 
Einstein’s passage from special to general relativity and the way 
that both illustrate Lacan’s Real: 
 
The logic of this [Hegelian] reversal is ultimately the same as 
the passage from the special to the general theory of relativity 
in Einstein. While the special theory already introduces the 
notion of curved space, it conceives of this curvature as the 
effect of matter . . . With the passage to the general theory, the 
causality is reversed: far from causing the curvature of space, 
matter is the effect. In the same way the Lacanian Real—the 
Thing—is not so much the inert presence that “curves” the 
symbolic space (introducing gaps and inconsistencies in it), but, 
rather, the effect of these gaps and inconsistencies.28 
 
The Real, then, is not ‘another Centre, a “deeper,” “truer” focal 
point or “black hole” around which symbolic formations fluctuate; 
rather, it is the obstacle on account of which every Centre is 
always displaced.’29 So just as the curvature of space-time is not 
caused by matter, matter being the effect of the curvature itself, 
the ‘Other’ does not lie outside of our symbolic network but is an 
effect of the very process by which symbolisation transpires. It is 
here, at this very point, that the notion of a ‘swerve’ operates. 
Because just as the existence of black holes are detected by the 
                                                
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid, 67. 
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way in which light swerves around them, the existence of the big 
‘Other’ is detected by the way that the mind is caught in the 
swerve of the Real. Once the Real is acknowledged as that 
which distorts reality, it can be seen not as that which causes the 
curve of mental space but as the effect of the breaks in symbolic 
space itself.  
 
Once we shift our perspective in an analogous move to Einstein, 
the Other can be seen for what it is, the effect of symbolisation. 
Once this is accepted, the big ‘Other’ can be acknowledged as 
such (as an effect, that is as ontologically ‘non-existent’) and 
human beings are released from the swerve of the Real that 
binds them. This shift of perspective indicates the importance of 
parallax and helps to explain the Derridean ‘Other’ in terms of 
failing to proceed to the noncoincidence of the One with itself (a 
step which indicates how Lacan avoids dualism and any sense of 
binary logic by noting that the original gap is inherent to the 
One). From a Derridean perspective (a post-structuralist reading 
of Lacan) the Real is understood in an analogous manner to 
special relativity (as somewhat equivalent to the tout autre). But 
what we need is a parallax view in which the Real is understood 
in an analogous manner to general relativity (or more precisely 
the move from special to general relativity) which allows for a 
move beyond ‘meaning’ to ‘jouissance’ (surplus 
enjoyment/fantasy) and to a focus on the ‘void’ around which 
symbolic space swerves. 
 
Conclusion 
 
On this Žižekean reading of reality, post-secular thought, bound 
as it is to the Derridean deconstructive gesture, fails to deliver 
the ‘religious’ because the ‘religious’ is itself an effect of the 
swerve of the Real. The ‘religious,’ then, does not ‘tap into’ the 
realm of the ‘impossible’ or evince human response to the tout 
autre and to a justice which is structurally always to come but 
indicates one of many ways in which human beings become 
caught in an illusory Real, reifying an excess in the symbolic 
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order. Post-secularity (including the framework in which it is set 
and the motifs that rise from it) can be understood according to 
an alternative reading of the ‘return of the religious,’ a reading 
that does not attempt to save the name of God (and reposition 
religion in the process) but to continue the process of 
secularisation as that process is reframed (in terms of 
overcoming any binary opposition between secular and sacred) 
and enriched through a Hegelian-Marxist-Lacanian critique of 
contemporary culture.  
 
Rather than imagining a post-secular space that opens religion to 
the tout autre, that space can be better understood as evidence 
of a swerve in symbolic space (in this case in reference to a 
religious Real: for ‘God’ belongs to the Lacanian Real), which in 
turn identifies a big ‘Other’ that must be understood as non-
existent if the patient is to be healed. So rather than joining the 
post-secular choir, we might ask instead whether there really is 
any Thing (das Ding) there to receive our praise, whether, after 
the collapse of metaphysics, the impossible Thing must be 
thought as preceding ontology and coming ‘after’ metaphysics 
(rather than functioning as a void and phantasmatic spectral 
kernel in the symbolic order), whether the Other (tout autre) that 
opens the space for the post-secular and becomes a centre 
around which the religious might be said to orbit (and to grant 
access) might be better understood according to the logic of 
jouissance, and whether an undeconstructable form of spirituality 
which rejoices in the play of différance would not be better 
understood in terms of a malady of the Real in response to a 
swerve in symbolic space requiring the acknowledgement of the 
nonexistence of the big ‘Other.’ 
 
